Pakistan’s Impact on Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan

Pakistan’s Weak Government Threatens US Operations

It does not take much reflection, after consulting a map of land-locked Afghanistan, to realize just how important Pakistan is for the US prosecution of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. Pakistan is one of six countries bordering Afghanistan; of those six, Pakistan has been the only one to provide us with nearly continual access since 9/11 to ground lines of communication for the transportation of cargo and supplies to Afghanistan. Up to 75% of materials bound for NATO and US troops in Afghanistan go by these routes, a huge percentage of our support. But critical as they are, these routes have some serious drawbacks. Our supplies must come by way of civilian vessels, enter through the civilian port of Karachi, and travel overland through Pakistan in civilian “jingle trucks” driven by local civilian contractors. Notice the complete lack of any US military presence, which renders our support more vulnerable than usual to ordinary pilferage, strikes and work stoppages by various labor unions. It does not help matters that the supply lines must run through the very provinces that have become Taliban havens following their expulsion from Afghanistan. This vulnerability is not lost on our military – which continually re-evaluates possible alternative routes – or on our enemies, who disrupt our transportation support from time to time with attacks on fuel and cargo trucks. All of these factors combine to give OEF logistical support a very low tolerance for instability in Pakistan.

Unfortunately, Pakistan is perennially saddled with political strife and extremist violence, and the Taliban and other extremists have long had a haven along the country’s porous border with Afghanistan. But the larger concern is that Pakistan is currently saddled with a weak government under Asif Ali Zardari, who was elected in September 2008 following Pervez Musharraf’s resignation a month earlier. Zardari’s track record so far does not bode well for keeping destabilizing forces in check.

Most recently, Pakistan’s internal politics under Zardari are contributing to increased instability in the country. In the news this week we have the latest rounds of mounting protests in response to a Supreme Court decision – viewed by many as engineered by Zardari – barring opposition leader (and former Prime Minister) Nawaz Sharif and his brother from holding office. That decision was followed by a Federal takeover of the provincial Punjab Parliament. The resulting protests and the government’s efforts to stifle them may yet lead to bloodshed, with Nawaz Sharif vowing “a revolution.” The similarities to events which led to Musharraf’s resignation are not lost on ordinary Pakistanis. As for US interests, in a worst-case scenario, an overturn of the government would introduce even more instability and uncertainty into the operating environment that the US depends on for logistical support to OEF. The US, realizing what is at stake, has intensified efforts to encourage a political reconciliation.

Secondly, Zardari’s reactions to extremist demands have been criticized as an appeasement strategy: in mid-February 2009, Zardari noted that the Taliban are a large and growing threat to Pakistan’s security, yet almost simultaneously he made concessions to the demands of a radical cleric in the Swat Valley, allowing Sharia law to replace secular courts in the Northwest Frontier Provinces. Zardari’s move, at the very least, takes some control out of the hands of the central government and cedes it to the tribal leaders in the Provinces. Worse, it effectively solidifies a safe haven for the Taliban in Pakistan. This is one of our most intractable problems in bringing a lasting peace to Afghanistan, as well as one of Pakistan’s most intractable problems in curbing extremist violence. In light of this troubling concession, Zardari’s later insistence that he will not negotiate with the Taliban rings hollow. One might have expected a firmer stand from the widower of Benazir Bhutto, who was assassinated by extremists as she campaigned during December 2007. He knows from bitter experience that to stand against extremists is dangerous; but appeasement only buys time, and such groups use that time to strengthen their own positions. Meanwhile, Zardari is spending his time trying to defuse a self-inflicted political crisis with Pakistan’s opposition leaders.

If President Obama is serious about success in Afghanistan, he will need to pay close attention to Pakistan. Indeed, the administration is currently putting together a long-term plan for Afghanistan which focuses, in part, on increased aid to Pakistan. The New York Times quoted Defense Secretary Robert Gates as saying, “The mission is to prevent the Taliban from retaking power against a democratically elected government in Afghanistan and thus turning Afghanistan, potentially again, into a haven for Al Qaeda and other extremist groups… We need to have goals, at least in the near- to midterm, that are achievable.” Small steps, then. The first of these should give priority to shoring up stability in Pakistan, and eliminating Taliban safe havens along the porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border by encouraging a stronger central government with firm control, rather than a weak government that makes damaging concessions.

Copyright R.N. Phillips, February 2009