Pakistan’s Weak Government Threatens US Operations
It does not take much reflection, after consulting a map of land-locked Afghanistan, to realize just how important Pakistan is for the US prosecution of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. Pakistan is one of six countries bordering Afghanistan; of those six, Pakistan has been the only one to provide us with nearly continual access since 9/11 to ground lines of communication for the transportation of cargo and supplies to Afghanistan. Up to 75% of materials bound for NATO and US troops in Afghanistan go by these routes, a huge percentage of our support. But critical as they are, these routes have some serious drawbacks. Our supplies must come by way of civilian vessels, enter through the civilian port of Karachi, and travel overland through Pakistan in civilian “jingle trucks” driven by local civilian contractors. Notice the complete lack of any US military presence, which renders our support more vulnerable than usual to ordinary pilferage, strikes and work stoppages by various labor unions. It does not help matters that the supply lines must run through the very provinces that have become Taliban havens following their expulsion from Afghanistan. This vulnerability is not lost on our military – which continually re-evaluates possible alternative routes – or on our enemies, who disrupt our transportation support from time to time with attacks on fuel and cargo trucks. All of these factors combine to give OEF logistical support a very low tolerance for instability in Pakistan.
Unfortunately, Pakistan is perennially saddled with political strife and extremist violence, and the Taliban and other extremists have long had a haven along the country’s porous border with Afghanistan. But the larger concern is that Pakistan is currently saddled with a weak government under Asif Ali Zardari, who was elected in September 2008 following Pervez Musharraf’s resignation a month earlier. Zardari’s track record so far does not bode well for keeping destabilizing forces in check.
Most recently, Pakistan’s internal politics under Zardari are contributing to increased instability in the country. In the news this week we have the latest rounds of mounting protests in response to a Supreme Court decision – viewed by many as engineered by Zardari – barring opposition leader (and former Prime Minister) Nawaz Sharif and his brother from holding office. That decision was followed by a Federal takeover of the provincial Punjab Parliament. The resulting protests and the government’s efforts to stifle them may yet lead to bloodshed, with Nawaz Sharif vowing “a revolution.” The similarities to events which led to Musharraf’s resignation are not lost on ordinary Pakistanis. As for US interests, in a worst-case scenario, an overturn of the government would introduce even more instability and uncertainty into the operating environment that the US depends on for logistical support to OEF. The US, realizing what is at stake, has intensified efforts to encourage a political reconciliation.
Secondly, Zardari’s reactions to extremist demands have been criticized as an appeasement strategy: in mid-February 2009, Zardari noted that the Taliban are a large and growing threat to Pakistan’s security, yet almost simultaneously he made concessions to the demands of a radical cleric in the Swat Valley, allowing Sharia law to replace secular courts in the Northwest Frontier Provinces. Zardari’s move, at the very least, takes some control out of the hands of the central government and cedes it to the tribal leaders in the Provinces. Worse, it effectively solidifies a safe haven for the Taliban in Pakistan. This is one of our most intractable problems in bringing a lasting peace to Afghanistan, as well as one of Pakistan’s most intractable problems in curbing extremist violence. In light of this troubling concession, Zardari’s later insistence that he will not negotiate with the Taliban rings hollow. One might have expected a firmer stand from the widower of Benazir Bhutto, who was assassinated by extremists as she campaigned during December 2007. He knows from bitter experience that to stand against extremists is dangerous; but appeasement only buys time, and such groups use that time to strengthen their own positions. Meanwhile, Zardari is spending his time trying to defuse a self-inflicted political crisis with Pakistan’s opposition leaders.
If President Obama is serious about success in Afghanistan, he will need to pay close attention to Pakistan. Indeed, the administration is currently putting together a long-term plan for Afghanistan which focuses, in part, on increased aid to Pakistan. The New York Times quoted Defense Secretary Robert Gates as saying, “The mission is to prevent the Taliban from retaking power against a democratically elected government in Afghanistan and thus turning Afghanistan, potentially again, into a haven for Al Qaeda and other extremist groups… We need to have goals, at least in the near- to midterm, that are achievable.” Small steps, then. The first of these should give priority to shoring up stability in Pakistan, and eliminating Taliban safe havens along the porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border by encouraging a stronger central government with firm control, rather than a weak government that makes damaging concessions.
Copyright R.N. Phillips, February 2009
Sunday, March 15, 2009
Thursday, January 15, 2009
Sri Lanka: End in Sight? Probably Not
The government may be in sight of victory, but don’t expect a lasting peace any time soon.
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), led by Velupillai Prabhakaran (or Pirapaharan), is one of the world’s most successful rebel groups, though rarely talked about in Western circles. Originating as a relatively small group of rebels, they eventually managed to seize and hold large swaths of territory at the northern end of Sri Lanka. They receive remittances from a worldwide network of Tamil sympathizers, and have used that income to help build not only their army, but also a naval force capable of sinking military vessels in government-controlled ports and on the open ocean, and even established something of a budding air force. They collected taxes and set up a parallel government in the northern part of the island, complete with Tamil-language schools, post offices, courts and laws, bus service, and many other civil functions. They even have a slick English-language website to promote their views. The group has successfully plied an international trade in weapons and other contraband with their fleet of oceangoing cargo vessels. They crippled the Sri Lankan economy with a spectacular 2001 attack on the international airport in Colombo, destroying or damaging 26 airliners and military aircraft. They also make a respectable showing in conventional battle and are adept at unconventional warfare: they kept the national army and over 50,000 Indian peacekeeping troops at bay, and repaid India for its three-year intervention by fighting them to a stalemate and causing over 1200 casualties among the Indian forces. Then, taking aim against the architects of the Indian intervention, they successfully assassinated India’s former Prime Minister in 1991, as well as Sri Lanka’s sitting President in 1993. They pioneered the use of suicide bombings, and for many years the LTTE alone was responsible for more successful suicide bombings than all Muslim extremist groups combined. There also is some evidence that they at least inspire other terrorist groups with their innovations, while some sources claim that they have actually provided training or other material support to those groups. They are quite prolific. All the foregoing barely scratches the surface of their activities.
Pretty impressive. Lest my glowing description of the LTTE be misconstrued as praise, let me make clear, I mention all of this because it is precisely what makes them so dangerous. We certainly need to take notice for our own interests, which in this case include regional stability, threats to shipping, damage to governments friendly to the US, and illegal activities within the US (mainly support to terrorism).
Now, after 25 years, the Sri Lankan government is apparently closing in. One might be tempted to give a cheer and draw the conclusion that strength, resolve, and unflinching aggression are just the ticket for wiping out terrorist insurgencies. But wait – not so fast. For one thing, Prabhakaran isn’t captured or dead just yet, and he has proven quite resourceful over the years. Keep in mind, he’s been at this for his entire adult life. For another, removing him from the LTTE leadership probably won’t result in the immediate breakdown of the organization; the LTTE is one of the most disciplined forces in the world. But for the sake of argument, let’s suppose that the Sri Lankan government succeeds in disbanding the LTTE at the conclusion of this offensive. That still does not mean that their troubles are over. The ethnic divide and all of its attendant injustices, which precipitated the last 25 years of conflict, remains firmly in place. And unless the Sri Lankan government intends genocide, the end of hostilities will still leave a large, aggrieved minority – heavily populated with former LTTE members – on one side of that divide, and the controlling majority on the other.
Prabhakaran came from a modest background, with a modest education, and started his rebel career with a modest group of people, yet he has built a major nonstate organization and a force to be reckoned with. Even if he is captured or killed, his accomplishments are a lesson taken more to heart by the likely losers – the Tamils – than the likely victors in this ethnic conflict. Unless the root grievances are fully addressed, they will continue to simmer, with or without Prabhakaran, with the risk of surging back to a full-blown conflict for the same reasons that all of the previous cease-fires and negotiations failed between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government.
The first rule of negotiations is, find the common ground and work from there. In this case, there is precious little to start with, and the end states that the two warring parties have in mind are completely incompatible. The LTTE will only settle for an independent homeland (one can argue the finer points of de facto vs. actual), while the Sri Lankan government will not brook any loss of territory, nor completely cede its authority.
The only way forward is for one party to give, and the only way that will happen is through a fundamental social shift between the ethnic groups – not impossible, but always hard to achieve. In this case, I would say the burden falls disproportionately on the Sinhalese majority to work toward a true reconciliation, for two reasons. First, while the Tamils are not blameless, it was Sinhalese majority abuses and discrimination which came to the forefront immediately after independence from Britain. And second, if the majority-Sinhalese government succeeds in crushing the LTTE, it is up to them to make a sincere, Lincolnesque gesture of healing. It is the victor on whom that responsibility falls, if for no other reason than the general rule that one can afford to negotiate from a position of strength. The task is made much more difficult for Sri Lanka, however, as they have no true period of unity to hark back to as their example. Given the intractable nature of ethnic strife, the bitter history of transgressions on both sides, and the still-festering divide between the minority Tamils and the majority Sinhalese, we can expect a generation or more of good-faith efforts, false starts, and relapses before any lasting peace is achieved.
Copyright R.N. Phillips, January 2009
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), led by Velupillai Prabhakaran (or Pirapaharan), is one of the world’s most successful rebel groups, though rarely talked about in Western circles. Originating as a relatively small group of rebels, they eventually managed to seize and hold large swaths of territory at the northern end of Sri Lanka. They receive remittances from a worldwide network of Tamil sympathizers, and have used that income to help build not only their army, but also a naval force capable of sinking military vessels in government-controlled ports and on the open ocean, and even established something of a budding air force. They collected taxes and set up a parallel government in the northern part of the island, complete with Tamil-language schools, post offices, courts and laws, bus service, and many other civil functions. They even have a slick English-language website to promote their views. The group has successfully plied an international trade in weapons and other contraband with their fleet of oceangoing cargo vessels. They crippled the Sri Lankan economy with a spectacular 2001 attack on the international airport in Colombo, destroying or damaging 26 airliners and military aircraft. They also make a respectable showing in conventional battle and are adept at unconventional warfare: they kept the national army and over 50,000 Indian peacekeeping troops at bay, and repaid India for its three-year intervention by fighting them to a stalemate and causing over 1200 casualties among the Indian forces. Then, taking aim against the architects of the Indian intervention, they successfully assassinated India’s former Prime Minister in 1991, as well as Sri Lanka’s sitting President in 1993. They pioneered the use of suicide bombings, and for many years the LTTE alone was responsible for more successful suicide bombings than all Muslim extremist groups combined. There also is some evidence that they at least inspire other terrorist groups with their innovations, while some sources claim that they have actually provided training or other material support to those groups. They are quite prolific. All the foregoing barely scratches the surface of their activities.
Pretty impressive. Lest my glowing description of the LTTE be misconstrued as praise, let me make clear, I mention all of this because it is precisely what makes them so dangerous. We certainly need to take notice for our own interests, which in this case include regional stability, threats to shipping, damage to governments friendly to the US, and illegal activities within the US (mainly support to terrorism).
Now, after 25 years, the Sri Lankan government is apparently closing in. One might be tempted to give a cheer and draw the conclusion that strength, resolve, and unflinching aggression are just the ticket for wiping out terrorist insurgencies. But wait – not so fast. For one thing, Prabhakaran isn’t captured or dead just yet, and he has proven quite resourceful over the years. Keep in mind, he’s been at this for his entire adult life. For another, removing him from the LTTE leadership probably won’t result in the immediate breakdown of the organization; the LTTE is one of the most disciplined forces in the world. But for the sake of argument, let’s suppose that the Sri Lankan government succeeds in disbanding the LTTE at the conclusion of this offensive. That still does not mean that their troubles are over. The ethnic divide and all of its attendant injustices, which precipitated the last 25 years of conflict, remains firmly in place. And unless the Sri Lankan government intends genocide, the end of hostilities will still leave a large, aggrieved minority – heavily populated with former LTTE members – on one side of that divide, and the controlling majority on the other.
Prabhakaran came from a modest background, with a modest education, and started his rebel career with a modest group of people, yet he has built a major nonstate organization and a force to be reckoned with. Even if he is captured or killed, his accomplishments are a lesson taken more to heart by the likely losers – the Tamils – than the likely victors in this ethnic conflict. Unless the root grievances are fully addressed, they will continue to simmer, with or without Prabhakaran, with the risk of surging back to a full-blown conflict for the same reasons that all of the previous cease-fires and negotiations failed between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government.
The first rule of negotiations is, find the common ground and work from there. In this case, there is precious little to start with, and the end states that the two warring parties have in mind are completely incompatible. The LTTE will only settle for an independent homeland (one can argue the finer points of de facto vs. actual), while the Sri Lankan government will not brook any loss of territory, nor completely cede its authority.
The only way forward is for one party to give, and the only way that will happen is through a fundamental social shift between the ethnic groups – not impossible, but always hard to achieve. In this case, I would say the burden falls disproportionately on the Sinhalese majority to work toward a true reconciliation, for two reasons. First, while the Tamils are not blameless, it was Sinhalese majority abuses and discrimination which came to the forefront immediately after independence from Britain. And second, if the majority-Sinhalese government succeeds in crushing the LTTE, it is up to them to make a sincere, Lincolnesque gesture of healing. It is the victor on whom that responsibility falls, if for no other reason than the general rule that one can afford to negotiate from a position of strength. The task is made much more difficult for Sri Lanka, however, as they have no true period of unity to hark back to as their example. Given the intractable nature of ethnic strife, the bitter history of transgressions on both sides, and the still-festering divide between the minority Tamils and the majority Sinhalese, we can expect a generation or more of good-faith efforts, false starts, and relapses before any lasting peace is achieved.
Copyright R.N. Phillips, January 2009
Wednesday, January 7, 2009
A Dangerous Addiction to Computers
We need alternate operational methods in both government and business – and need to use them.
Addiction: “the state of being enslaved to a habit or practice or to something that is psychologically or physically habit-forming… to such an extent that its cessation causes severe trauma.”
It has probably happened to everyone once or twice. You are in a store someplace when the computers crash and the registers stop working. Suddenly business grinds to a halt, clerks stand idle, and customers abandon the store as managers scurry to fix the computers. In large franchises, I have yet to see the employees simply shift to a backup method of doing business, such as carbon-paper receipts and battery-operated calculators. While we stand slack-jawed waiting for the computers to come back online, millions of merchants in the less-developed world continue to do brisk business simply by opening their cash boxes and making change, something we have lost the ability to do.
No, no, I am not advocating a return to dusty outdoor markets and unrefrigerated meat. I am generally in favor of technological advances. Computers have definitely changed our lives for the better. But what worries me is a twofold situation: computers have become ubiquitous in practically every aspect of our inter-linked critical infrastructure; and we have reached a point of utter helplessness in the face of technological failure. “Backup” means to shift to another automated system. We can scarcely imagine any alternate way of doing things, despite the fact that we were doing them in some alternate way not so long ago.
I am feeling my age these days. As a Signal officer in 1988, I was taught to calculate radio shots manually, accounting for the terrain, the curvature of the earth, the frequencies used, and even the presence of trees. Some years later, computer programs were perfected for this purpose, and we were pleased and impressed with the speed and ease that automation brought to a rather tedious task. But as my career progressed in step with technology, I sometimes worried that we were becoming far too dependent on the convenience of such programs and equipment, and were losing skills that were previously basic to the performance of our jobs. In my later years in the Army, I never met a young lieutenant who could manually profile a radio shot. The necessary forms and instructions were equally scarce. What would happen if those computers didn’t work? Could we even put a network together? Does anyone remember how to do this the “old-fashioned way”?
Where critical infrastructure is concerned, some organizations have better backup plans than others, but all are limited by their dependence on electronic technology. I am less concerned about ordinary equipment and data failures than about intentional attacks; and I am less concerned about ordinary hacker attacks than about those sponsored by a foreign government or nonstate actors, which could conceivably coordinate a broad simultaneous attack on the many and various systems that manage our overall critical infrastructure.
This is not so far-fetched. We are too often complacent concerning the “routine” threat of viruses which are used to collect information, control remote systems, and destroy functionality. This applies equally to government, military, and civilian systems. Think classified systems are safe because they are separate from the Internet? Think again. It is rare, but they do get infected with viruses, entirely due to human error. And unclassified government and business systems are breached on a regular basis. Anywhere you have a system that must communicate as part of its function, you have significant vulnerability. Firewalls and anti-virus software are helpful, but they only go so far. Real system protection requires an army of skilled technicians always on the alert for any intrusion, and even then, breaches will occur. Inside jobs are also a real concern that should not be downplayed, given the potential for damage.
As for the civilian systems, what constitutes critical infrastrucure? There are the obvious ones: hospitals, police stations, air traffic control, emergency call centers, power and water treatment plants, the financial sector, and so on. But some things are equally critical, yet so humble and ordinary as to go unrecognized: for instance, the grocery store. Disrupting the food supply is always a good way to precipitate chaos in any society, and unfortunately, disrupting their computer systems would be an easy way to do it. With a little imagination and minimal effort, a cyberattacker could come up with other targets to promote confusion and economic damage: loss of function at gas stations, cell phone networks, even cable TV, would just barely scrape the surface of possibility.
Back to my opening scenario, I find it interesting that the few places I have seen clerks simply pull out carbon paper and continue to march in the face of computer failure is in the small Mom-and-Pop businesses. The larger and more “networked” a franchise is, the more helpless they are at these moments; and certainly, major private infrastructure and government organizations are very large, and very networked. There is much to be said in favor of the autonomy of the small businessman; for these businesses, the computers were a useful tool used on a daily basis, but the clerks could instantly turn away from them and use the time-honored method of pencil and paper. No addictions there. Our large businesses and government organizations at all levels should take their cue from this, putting alternate operational methods in place and regularly training their employees to use them. That would go far toward breaking our addiction to computers.
I love technology. I just don’t like being dependent on it.
Copyright January 2009, R.N. Phillips
Addiction: “the state of being enslaved to a habit or practice or to something that is psychologically or physically habit-forming… to such an extent that its cessation causes severe trauma.”
It has probably happened to everyone once or twice. You are in a store someplace when the computers crash and the registers stop working. Suddenly business grinds to a halt, clerks stand idle, and customers abandon the store as managers scurry to fix the computers. In large franchises, I have yet to see the employees simply shift to a backup method of doing business, such as carbon-paper receipts and battery-operated calculators. While we stand slack-jawed waiting for the computers to come back online, millions of merchants in the less-developed world continue to do brisk business simply by opening their cash boxes and making change, something we have lost the ability to do.
No, no, I am not advocating a return to dusty outdoor markets and unrefrigerated meat. I am generally in favor of technological advances. Computers have definitely changed our lives for the better. But what worries me is a twofold situation: computers have become ubiquitous in practically every aspect of our inter-linked critical infrastructure; and we have reached a point of utter helplessness in the face of technological failure. “Backup” means to shift to another automated system. We can scarcely imagine any alternate way of doing things, despite the fact that we were doing them in some alternate way not so long ago.
I am feeling my age these days. As a Signal officer in 1988, I was taught to calculate radio shots manually, accounting for the terrain, the curvature of the earth, the frequencies used, and even the presence of trees. Some years later, computer programs were perfected for this purpose, and we were pleased and impressed with the speed and ease that automation brought to a rather tedious task. But as my career progressed in step with technology, I sometimes worried that we were becoming far too dependent on the convenience of such programs and equipment, and were losing skills that were previously basic to the performance of our jobs. In my later years in the Army, I never met a young lieutenant who could manually profile a radio shot. The necessary forms and instructions were equally scarce. What would happen if those computers didn’t work? Could we even put a network together? Does anyone remember how to do this the “old-fashioned way”?
Where critical infrastructure is concerned, some organizations have better backup plans than others, but all are limited by their dependence on electronic technology. I am less concerned about ordinary equipment and data failures than about intentional attacks; and I am less concerned about ordinary hacker attacks than about those sponsored by a foreign government or nonstate actors, which could conceivably coordinate a broad simultaneous attack on the many and various systems that manage our overall critical infrastructure.
This is not so far-fetched. We are too often complacent concerning the “routine” threat of viruses which are used to collect information, control remote systems, and destroy functionality. This applies equally to government, military, and civilian systems. Think classified systems are safe because they are separate from the Internet? Think again. It is rare, but they do get infected with viruses, entirely due to human error. And unclassified government and business systems are breached on a regular basis. Anywhere you have a system that must communicate as part of its function, you have significant vulnerability. Firewalls and anti-virus software are helpful, but they only go so far. Real system protection requires an army of skilled technicians always on the alert for any intrusion, and even then, breaches will occur. Inside jobs are also a real concern that should not be downplayed, given the potential for damage.
As for the civilian systems, what constitutes critical infrastrucure? There are the obvious ones: hospitals, police stations, air traffic control, emergency call centers, power and water treatment plants, the financial sector, and so on. But some things are equally critical, yet so humble and ordinary as to go unrecognized: for instance, the grocery store. Disrupting the food supply is always a good way to precipitate chaos in any society, and unfortunately, disrupting their computer systems would be an easy way to do it. With a little imagination and minimal effort, a cyberattacker could come up with other targets to promote confusion and economic damage: loss of function at gas stations, cell phone networks, even cable TV, would just barely scrape the surface of possibility.
Back to my opening scenario, I find it interesting that the few places I have seen clerks simply pull out carbon paper and continue to march in the face of computer failure is in the small Mom-and-Pop businesses. The larger and more “networked” a franchise is, the more helpless they are at these moments; and certainly, major private infrastructure and government organizations are very large, and very networked. There is much to be said in favor of the autonomy of the small businessman; for these businesses, the computers were a useful tool used on a daily basis, but the clerks could instantly turn away from them and use the time-honored method of pencil and paper. No addictions there. Our large businesses and government organizations at all levels should take their cue from this, putting alternate operational methods in place and regularly training their employees to use them. That would go far toward breaking our addiction to computers.
I love technology. I just don’t like being dependent on it.
Copyright January 2009, R.N. Phillips
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